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Competition Versus Regulation in

Medical Care: An Overdrawn
Dichotomy
Randall R. Bovbjerg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical care is expensive, and it rapidly is becoming even
more so. This truism is much discussed as we enter the ninth decade of the twentieth century. People voice concern about the size
of hospital and doctor bills, the price of group health insurance,
the rapid rise of government health care spending, and even the
share of the gross national product devoted to health spending.1
The main problem-at least with most medical care-is that both
patients and medical care providers are insufficiently cost conscious at the time that medical spending decisions are made.2 The
principal roots of this problem are the provider-dominated nature
of medical care decisionmaking, the third-party payment system
that has evolved to protect patients from medical costs, and the
resulting biases of the delivery system.'
* Senior Research Associate, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.; formerly Senior
Attorney, State Rating Bureau, Massachusetts Division of Insurance; A.B., 1968, University
of Chicago; J.D., 1971, Harvard University. Although work on this Article was partially supported by funds provided through the Urban Institute, the views expressed herein should
not be construed as official Institute policy.
1. The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., Iglehart, You Can't Have It Both Ways, 9
NAT'L J. 1086 (1977).
2. This Article focuses upon cost containment and efficiency, and thus discusses what
may be termed "overinsurance." See Pauly, Overinsurance:The ConceptualIssues, in NATIONAL HEALTH INsURANcE:

WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER?

201 (M. Pauly. ed.

1980). A significant problem of underinsurance also exists, however, with as much as 13% of
the population of the United States totally unprotected. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE,
SouRcE BOOK OF HEALTH INsURANcE DATA, 1979-1980, at 11 [hereinafter cited as SoURcE
BOOK]. Some procompetitive proposals address the latter issue, and others do not.
3. This Article is thus principally concerned with what might be termed "mainstream"
medical care-that is, care for the working population and Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, consisting mainly of curative services from physicians and general hospitals. The
separate and severe cost and other problems of long-term care, catastrophic illness, and
public provision of care of last resort deserve separate attention. To a great extent, they are
problems of caring for the very needy-the aged and chronically ill,
the mentally retarded,
victims of end-stage renal disease, and so on-whose integration into conventional insurance
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For a variety of reasons, many people are looking to federal
action to deal with the cost problems. How best to address these
issues is the subject of this Symposium and this Article. The possibilities usually are posed as a choice between increased government regulation to control medical costs or increased competition.
This dichotomy, however, is overly simplistic. In many ways we already have a very competitive health care financing and delivery
system, but the present competition is not productive. Moreover,
regulation in the sense of government efforts to control costs will
always exist-at least as long as government continues to be a
principal third-party payer and deliverer of services of last resort.
Other regulation is also needed to promote the correct sort of
competition.
Instead of relying solely on this overdrawn dichotomy for policy guidance, we should be asking just what is wrong with our present health care system, what corrective incentives are needed, and
whether they should be imposed on a system-wide or a decentralized basis. The focus should be on the kinds and mix of competition and regulation that are most desirable.
This Article discusses these issues in considering the "competitive" approach to reforming medical care financing and delivery.
Although the approach is an extremely promising one, strongly
held individual and social values underlie the current system, and
powerful private interests have a stake in the status quo. Reforms,
therefore, may never be fully implemented or realize their theoretical potential in practice. In any case they will take some time to
work; no approach can be an immediate panacea. If government is
to embark upon a "procompetitive" course, it needs to proceed
carefully. Especially during the transition to a more competitive
system, we need to be particularly careful to create constructive
incentives, whether through regulatory or competitive means, and
not to get the worst of both worlds by inappropriately mixing
them. This Article considers the sources of current cost problems,
discusses regulatory and procompetitive responses, notes the lessons of today's unproductive competition for future procompetitive
efforts, and makes some policy suggestions.

plans would be even more difficult than it is for Medicare and most Medicaid beneficiaries.

1981
II.

COMPETITION VS. REGULATION
WEAK COST-CONTROL INCENTIVES: INHERENT IN DOCTOR-

PATIENT RELATIONS, OR DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF THIRD

PARTIES?

The current marketplace for medical services is far from the
competitive ideal in which the prices and quantities of services are
set by supply and demand, with knowledgeable and price-conscious consumers confronting competitive suppliers.4 Virtually all
real-world markets, of course, differ from the idealized economic
model. In the case of medical care services, however, cost-enhancing, noncompetitive structures, incentives, and behavior seem to be
particularly extreme.
Many noncompetitive features of current arrangements appear
to be inherent in the fundamental nature of the medical care enterprise.' Thus, medical care may be intrinsically different from
other spheres of economic activity. Such a view is often expressed
as being self-evident-that of course the medical care marketplace
cannot function correctly, and therefore government regulation is
necessary to control costs and achieve other goals." This view holds
that competition is inherently impossible for a variety of reasons,
the most important of which is that providers-primarily physicians, but also hospitals and others-dominate resource-allocation
decisions in medicine.7 Providing medical care is a very technical
enterprise in which providers are expert and consumers are often
largely ignorant. Both the desirability of treatment and the quality
of care provided are difficult for laymen to evaluate, and the information cost to consumers to learn about health and medicine is
quite high. Thus, consumers do not know very well what they
want, and consumer sovereignty-a fundamental axiom of freemarket economics-is seriously weakened.
As a consequence, patients delegate much decisionmaking to
their doctors, who often play the role of consumer as well as provider. Indeed, only doctors can admit patients to a hospital, order
lab tests, and arrange for the consumption of other types of care.
This situation leads to the common observation that physicians to
some extent can "create demand" for their own and other medical
4. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL
LwE? (1974).
5. See generally Arrow, Uncertaintyand the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963).
6. See, e.g., E. KENNEDY, IN CRITCAL CONDrrON: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S HEALTH
C
(1972).
SE
7. See generally id.
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services.' Patients fully control only their initial decision to seek
medical attention.' The doctor, more than the patient, then, determines when care is desirable, as well as what care should be given
and how much is appropriate. It is also the doctor who defines a
unit of service and, to a great extent, judges whether it has been
successful. A large part of what a doctor provides is thus not the
medical service itself (which may indeed be given by a hospital or
other provider) but expertise in its consumption and evaluation.
Consumers generally have trouble judging when a particular service is needed, but they have even greater difficulty judging its
quality-and hence its worth-before it is given.
Moreover, patients in pain or in danger of life and limb are
seldom very price conscious or able to bargain over the terms of
their care. There is a general presumption in favor of high. quality,
almost regardless of cost. When a miscalculation can have serious
and potentially irreversible consequences, consumers are not apt to
make close quality-versus-cost calculations. Although "shopping
around" for alternative providers is hardest when important care is
needed quickly, it is never easy. The product is not well-defined,
and it can be difficult to anticipate future needs and services, particularly when many are ordered by the physician and not the patient. The cost and quality of the total package of goods and services may not even be assessible in advance, since much will
depend on diagnostic and therapeutic developments after the initial visit to the doctor. Comparing medical care prices is also difficult because the quality of care may vary considerably in ways that
consumers find hard to assess. Even professionals have great difficulty in assessing the quality of care under different treatments. In
medical literature, great battles are fought over what constitutes
quality and how it is to be measured; there are even indications
that much medical care is poorly evaluated by physicians themselves and is of unproven effectiveness.10
Patients can of course become more sophisticated consumers,
but only at considerable cost in search time, self-education, and
8. See Holahan, Physician Reimbursement, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURACE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES 73 & n.4 (J. Feder, J. Holahan & T. Marmor eds. 1980).
9. L. ROSSITER, NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITuREs STUDY: WHO INITIATES VIsrrs
TO A PHYSICIAN? 1 (Natl Center for Health Serv. Research, Sept. 1980, HHS Pub. No.
(PHS) 80-3278).
10.

See, e.g., A. COCHRANE, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICEMNCY: RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON

HEALTH SERVICES (1972); Brook & Appel, Quality-of-CareAssessment: Choosing a Method
for Peer Review, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1323 (1973).
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the like. Because of the need to entrust important decisions to
physicians, an ethic of doctor-patient trust is an important part of
the commercial relationship. A long-standing relationship and
knowledge of a patient's history and circumstances may also improve the quality of care. Because this factor makes shopping
around even more costly and difficult, many patients are understandably quite reluctant to change doctors.1 1
Clearly, the extent to which competitiveness in health care
departs from the theoretical ideal varies according to circumstances-from great departures such as with emergency hospital
care, to minor ones like purchasing an identified drug. In many
cases, however, it is difficult to see anything approaching ideal
competition regardless of the circumstances.
On the other hand, the medical care market may be different
only in degree and not in kind from other marketplaces that allocate resources without the need for significant governmental intervention. Some commentators maintain that we have merely
created a medical services marketplace in which inappropriate
structures and incentives lead to cost-increasing behavior.1 2 Under
this view, the chief villain is insufficiently constrained third-party
payment for care. While doctors and patients decide what care to
consume, payment for that care is typically made by a "third
party" to the transaction. The third-party payer may be a private
insurance plan or a government program, and the patient may or
may not be liable for a portion of the payment. Third-party payment, by divorcing consumption decisions from payment responsi13
bility, greatly decreases cost consciousness at the time of need.
Indeed, reducing or eliminating precisely this anxiety over payment is one of this system's chief virtues, if not its major reason
for being. The payment system has wide-spread effects because it
features broad, almost comprehensive coverage of many or most
medical services. Employment group plans-by far the dominant
mode of purchase-often include even dental care, psychiatric social work, and other such services traditionally not considered part
11. This factor is often cited as a reason that Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) of the prepaid group practice type find it difficult to attract older subscribers who
may have free choice of provider under Medicare or a fee-for-service style HMO.
12. See, e.g., Feldstein, The Welfare Loss from Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL.
EcON. 251 (1973); McClure, The Medical Care System under National Health Insurance:
Four Models, 1 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 22 (1976); Pauly, The Economics of Moral
Hazard, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 531 (1968).
13. See Feldstein, supra note 12; McClure, supra note 12; Pauly, supra note 12.
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of medical service.
Other aspects of our financing system, in addition to the basic
fact of third-party payment, also contribute to cost-increasing behavior. One feature is the method of paying providers. Doctors,
hospitals, and others are typically paid on a fee-for-service basis,
which gives providers more revenue only when they provide more
services; hence, it penalizes economizers. 14 Third-party payment
also typically pays almost the entire cost of each covered service,
with little cost-sharing by the patient, particularly for inpatient
hospital care. Insurance often provides almost "first-dollar" coverage, meaning that deductibles (initial costs of care that must be
borne by patients) are relatively small or nonexistent for many services. Traditionally most coverage was not only first-dollar, it was
also "shallow," in that it left uncovered major expenses beyond
certain levels. Recently, however, "deeper,". "major medical," and
even "catastrophic" coverage has become the norm, 15 greatly expanding protection for the insured-and also reducing cost restraints in the system-although gaps remain for many insureds.
Moreover, most insurance pays for institutional care on a costrelated "reimbursement" basis. Most Blue Cross plans, Medicare,
and Medicaid-the last with some exceptions-purport to pay the
full "reasonable costs" of hospitals.1 " Regardless of whether actual
costs are met fully, payment is closely related to costs actually incurred. The critical incentive is that an institution is typically paid
more for raising its costs and less if it holds down its costs. Blue
Cross plans usually pay on a "service" basis directly to the hospital; the patient sees a bill only much later, if at all. Most "commercial" insurers-that is, for-profit or mutual, conventional insurance
plans-pay reasonable hospital "charges." These charges are
whatever the hospital actually bills, within reason, which tends to
'17
be higher than "cost.
In the case of physician payment, Blue Shield plans, Medicare,
14. E.g., Holahan, supra note 8,at 78.
15. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE (1976)
[hereinafter cited as GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE]; SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2; Havighurst,
Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Disease, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1976, at 122, 124-27.
16. See, e.g., Feder & Spitz, The Politics of Hospital Payment, in NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES, supra note 8,at 301, 303-11.
17. See generally id. Some plans, particularly the relatively small number of commercial ones sold on a nongroup basis, pay only "indemnity" amounts-that is, fixed sums per
day. These sums may be well below actual costs or charges, leaving the balance to be paid
by the patient.
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and often Medicaid pay some variant of the "usual, customary,
and reasonable" (UCR) fees.18 "UCR" means that physicians are
paid based upon how much they usually have charged for a given
service during a previous accounting period unless that usual
charge exceeds what is customarily charged by most other doctors
in their specialty; and even this amount may be raised if a special
reason exists for doing so. This system allows doctors to be paid
what they normally bill and raises the customary ceiling as fast as
doctors raise their bills. Other health care professionals, if they are
not paid by a hospital that is then "reimbursed," may be paid on a
UCR basis or for their actual fees up to some fixed limit set by the
insurance policy. Commercial insurers, on the other hand, usually
do not pay UCR per se, but pay actual fees limited to some maximum "reasonable" amount-often a customary charge limit computed for a geographic area.19
Whatever the system, provider payment is generally thought
of and paid as "reimbursement,"2 0 meaning that providers determine what level of medical spending is appropriate, undertake that
level, and are repaid for their spending. Thus, the medical care
providers whose services are covered are less the takers of a price
impersonally set in a free market than they are the setters of the
price. Each doctor or hospital (except those charging over some
ceiling) receives an insurance payment unique to that provider.
Moreover, an insurance plan almost always gives its enrollees "free
choice of provider." Medicare and Medicaid by law allow patients
to receive care from any licensed provider who is also accredited
for the program, which means almost all of them.2 ' Private insurers similarly, for competitive reasons, cover all or almost all providers. Thus, insureds may go as patients to whichever provider
they (or their doctor) choose and still receive comprehensive coverage and payment. This system largely frees providers from the
necessity of competing for patients on a price basis.
The effect of all of these features is that an insured patient
typically faces a very small or even nonexistent cost at the time of
service. In 1979, 63.5% of physician payments and fully 91.9% of
hospital payments were made by third parties. Only 36.5% and
8.1%, respectively, of these payments were out-of-pocket payments
18. See Holahan, supra note 8, at 81-83.
19. See, e.g., GRoUP HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 15, at 26-31.
20. See, e.g., Feder & Spitz, supra note 16; Holahan, supra note 8.
21. Freedom of choice by the patient is guaranteed by statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b
(1976) (Medicare); § 1396a(23) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (Medicaid).
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by patients themselves.2 2 Under these circumstances, it is virtually
impossible to rely on either consumers or providers to insist that
every dollar spent by a third party produce a dollar's worth of care.
Patients are motivated to seek every treatment of any potential
value, and of course providers are motivated to help them as much
as possible, with an additional effect being to increase providers'
own revenues.2
The final notable characteristic of insured fee-for-service care
is that insurers and government programs have been very slow to
impose their own cost-containment limits as a substitute for the
largely absent market discipline.2 Competition among insurers has
tended to focus upon providing more comprehensive coverage,
better access to providers, good claims service, and the like. Cost
control has primarily meant holding down administrative costs, including such things as claims payment mistakes, rather than controlling medical services rendered.
The result of all of these factors is that our current medical
care financing and delivery system is not very cost-conscious or
price-competitive. The bottom line is that considerable professional autonomy exists in resource allocation. Medical spending
consequently is much higher than it theoretically might be. To
some extent, this result may be inherent in the system, given the
nature of medicine and deep-seated individual preferences. To
some extent, it is clearly due to the financing and delivery system
that presently exists. Both the "intrinsic market failure" and "insurance market failure" views seem to be correct. Medicine is considered special, and this belief is reflected not only in our firstparty relations with medical providers, but also in the third-party
financing relationships that we have created. Unconstrained thirdparty payment is not only a cause of higher spending; it is also the
result of important social and cultural forces. Whether medical
care "could" be more competitive and less expensive under a system of one hundred percent first-party payment is a moot point
because personal and social choices have acted systematically to
make third-party systems dominant. An uninsured world is both
undesirable and unlikely. Thus, the real question is how to make
22. Gibson, National Health Expenditures, 1979, 2 HEALTH CARE FINANCING Ray. 1,
25, 27 (Table 5) (Health Care Financing Admin. Summer 1980).
23. See, e.g., Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6 (1975).
24. Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's
Hand, 1 J. HEALTH POL.,

POL'Y

& L. 471 (1977).
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the third-party system behave more cost-consciously and deliver
medical care more efficiently.
III.

REGULATION VERSUS COMPETITION IN COST CONTROL
A.
1.

Regulatory Efforts

Program-Specific and System-Wide Controls

The main cost-controlling response to the rapid rise in medical
spending has come from government. In a sense, this fact is not
surprising since government medical spending has been rising even
more rapidly than medical spending overall.2 5 Cost-control concerns, however, extend beyond the money spent on government
programs, in part no doubt because to guarantee access for public
beneficiaries government programs must pay competitive prices to
providers.
To date, most public cost-control initiatives have been regulatory in nature. Generally, "regulation" means that public rather
than private choices dominate cost control, but it is useful to distinguish among types of regulation. The principal regulatory efforts seek to control spending under government programs, primarily Medicare and Medicaid. Such efforts have attempted to limit
the number of services paid for, through utilization control And
"Professional Standards Review Organization" (PSRO) review of
inpatient care to judge its necessity and appropriateness.2 Price
controls for government beneficiaries have also been tried; "routine" Medicare hospital costs-room and board-are subject to a
ceiling for which increases are limited.2 7 Some of the state-admin25.

See Gibson, supra note 22, at 16 (Table 1). The governmental share of health

expenditures rose from 26% in 1965 to 43% in 1979, with the federal share rising from 13%
to 29%. Id. Such increases in spending, even starting from a relatively low base, have raised
considerable pressures to economize. Another reason that government appears more concerned about spending increases than the private sector is the redistributive nature of government spending. Medicare, Medicaid, public hospitals, and other government programs
pay for care for parts of society with taxes largely drawn from other parts. In contrast,
insured private spending involves people buying their own insurance, even though considerable pooling and risk-spreading occurs. Ironically, it is also notable that in the public sector,
medical spending must compete dollar-for-dollar with other needs, whereas private medical
spending (along with other fringe benefits) is tax subsidized compared with other possible
expenditures.
26. See generally Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health Maintenance Organizations:Are They Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L. REy.
381, 382; Havighurst & Blumstein, supranote 23; Stuart, Utilization Controls, in NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES, supra note 8, at 423.

27. Routine cost limits, which restrict the growth of room-and-board costs but not
those of ancillary services, are known as § 223 limits, after that section of the Social Security
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istered Medicaid programs also control hospital rates rather than
paying "reasonable costs."28 Also, the rise in Medicare payments to
physicians has been limited by an extrinsic index; consequently,
increases in physician billings do not automatically become higher
allowable Medicare fees.2 9 Controls under Medicaid have been
even more drastic. Many states have imposed long-lasting freezes
or even cuts in physician payments, for example, since they are not
required to "update" their physician payments on a regular basis.30
The federal government has also attempted to control the cost of
care under Medicare and Medicaid by requiring "section 1122"
approval of increases in the number of hospital beds and other
capital investments.3 1
All of these controls attempt to curb only public program expenditures. Some are indeed successful in that they hold down
growth in particular categories of government expenditures, such
as Medicaid physician services. 3 2 There is consensus, however, that
their success has been limited."3 Physicians, for example, can simply refuse to accept Medicaid patients or Medicare's allowable fee
as payment in full since there is ample demand from other insured
payers willing to pay higher fees."4 Hospitals have also been able to
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 223, 86 Stat. 1393 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(v)(1)). See [1980] 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 7541.
28. A state's Medicaid plan may provide for an alternative method of payment for
inpatient hospital services. See [1979] 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,725.67. As
many as eleven states have done so.
29. Section 224 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972 allows Medicare physician
payment ceilings to be limited by an economic index, beginning in 1973. Pub. L. No. 92-603,
§ 224, 86 Stat. 1395 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)). See [1980] 1 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 1 3225.
30. B. Sprrz, STATE GUIDE TO MEDICAID COST CONTAINMENT (1980) (Center for Policy
Research, National Governors Association).
31. Section 1122 takes its name from that section of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-1 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979) (added by Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 221, 86 Stat. 1386
(1972)). It disallows Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for that portion of hospital expenses attributable to capital investments not approved by local planning agencies.
32. In almost every state examined in a forthcoming Urban Institute study, physician
payments grew more slowly as a category of expenditure than other state Medicaid expenditures. Bovbjerg, Health Services Spending, in EFFECTS OF STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURE
LIMITATIONS ON HUMAN SERVICES INANCING (G. Peterson ed., forthcoming).
33. Perhaps the most convincing evidence is the continuing concern over mounting
costs. See, e.g., Demkovich, For States Squeezed by Medicaid Costs, The Worst Crunch Is
Still to Come, 13 NAT'L J. 44 (1981).
34. According to the Select Committee on Aging of the U.S. House of Representatives,
"Today, doctors accept assignment for only 1 out of every 2 elderly patients; 2 out of 3
elderly patients were accepted for assignment in 1966." HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICARE AFTER
ELDERLY? 12 (Comm. Print 1980).

15
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shift costs to uncontrolled areas by raising ancillary charges faster
than room and board.35 Moreover, even if some governmental costs
are limited, much spending may be shifted to the private sector, as
when hospitals raise rates to "charge-paying" patients to make up
for deficits on Medicaid patients.
Some system-wide government regulations have also been implemented, applying across-the-board to all providers. For example, price controls on all medical services were an important feature of the short-lived Economic Stabilization Program of 197174.36 Currently, two types of controls are prominent. The federal
section 1122 limits on hospital investment-applicable only under
Medicare and Medicaid-have been replicated on a system-wide
basis under state certificate-of-need laws, which were virtually
mandated by the Federal Health Planning Act of 1974. 8 In addition, many states have enacted price or budget controls for hospitals going far beyond earlier controls that applied only to Medicaid.3 8 Other regulatory proposals have been made; former
President Carter's proposed hospital cost-containment controls
were a high priority but were twice defeated.39
2.

Internal-Incentive Programs

In addition to distinguishing regulation as program-specific or
system-wide, it is useful to differentiate between extrinsic controls
imposed on providers and attempts to change their internal incentives through government regulation. Planning restrictions, for example, are extrinsic controls. They attempt to superimpose external requirements upon health care institutions' own plans based
35. One hospital examined in a recent Urban Institute study provides a dramatic
example. It had routine charges that rose from $17.3 to $17.6 million during 1974-79, while
ancillary charges rose from $6.1 to $20.0 million. L. PARINGER & R. BOVBJRRG, HEALTH
RELATED

PROGRAMS

IN AN ERA OF FISCAL LIMITATIONS: THE

MCHIGAN CASE STUDY

(forthcoming).
36. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Inflation and the Economic StabilizationProgram,in HEATH:
A VICTIM OR CAUSE OF INFLATION? 31 (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. I1 1979). See generally Symposium:
Certificate-of-NeedLaws in Health Planning,1978 UTAH L. Ray. 1; see also note 31 supra
and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Bauer, Hospital Rate Setting-This Way to Salvation?, in HOSPITAL
COST CONTAINMENT 324 (M. Zubkoff, L Raskin & R. Hanft eds. 1978).
39. The bill would have created federal hospital rate setting for institutions in states
that did not have their own mandatory rate-setting programs. It would have limited the
growth of revenues available for hospital spending. See Dunn & Lefkowitz, The Hospital
Cost Containment Act of 1977: An Analysis of the Administration'sProposal,in HOSPITAL
COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 38, at 166 (discussing the 1977 version; it and the next session's counterpart were both defeated).
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upon their own incentives. Reimbursement reforms, in contrast, attempt to alter incentives. Notable among the latter are hospital
rate-setting programs that establish prospective prices rather than
paying full cost retrospectively.40 Prospective systems rely upon
the incentives of advanced limited payment to induce hospitals to
economize. Unlike the situation under retrospective cost-based
payment, increasing costs does not immediately increase thirdparty payments. There are many varieties of prospective systems.
Most rate-setting programs project an institution's past costs to
determine allowable future rates and thus address only the rate of
change in spending. Other programs go further, penalizing relatively high-cost facilities by setting rates for care not by the actual
costs of a given institution but according to something like the average costs of all similar facilities. They may also reward efficiency
by allowing below-average-cost hospitals to keep their savings.
Over time these incentives may create downward pressure on the
average as well. 41 Such incentive-oriented approaches make theo-

retical sense 42 and may be one reason why mature rate-setting programs show evidence of controlling costs, while health-planning
controls-like section 1122 and certificate-of-need approval-do
not.

43

B. Promoting Competition
In the 1970s, an alternative economizing strategy came to the
fore: greater reliance on newly increased and restructured competitive forces and private economizing choices. A procompetitive
strategy is very appealing because, among other reasons, it would
operate system-wide and would alter consumer and provider incentives. Correctly functioning competition holds promise of controlling overall costs by achieving medical efficiencies rather than
40. See Bauer, supra note 38; Hamilton, Walter & Cromwell, First Annual Report of
the National Hospital Rate-Setting Study: A Comparative Review of Nine Prospective
Rate-Setting Programs, in HEALTH CARE: FINANCING GRANTs & CONTRACTS REPORT (1980)
(Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration).
41. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGSLATtR
s,
Hospital Case Mix Reimbursement: The New Jersey Diagnostic Related Groups Experiment, in STATE HEALTH
NoTEs (Sept. 1980) (Intergovernmental Health Policy Project).
42. See, e.g., Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest, HARPmS, May 1977, at 43
(superiority of "incentives" approach to social intervention over "command-and-control"
method).
43. Steinwald & Sloan, Regulatory Approaches to Hospital Cost Containment: A Synthesis of the Empirical Evidence (Sept. 1980) (paper presented at American Enterprise
Institute Conference on Health Care: Professional Ethics, Government Regulation, or Markets?, Washington, D.C.).
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merely by reducing what government pays for care. The first major
effort of this sort was the "Health Maintenance Organization"
44
(HMO) strategy adopted by the Nixon Administration in 1971.
That strategy was to promote HMOs, alternative medical service
organizations that contract to deliver comprehensive care on a prepaid basis and are thus well motivated to economize, unlike insured fee-for-service providers. 45 By subsidizing HMOs and preempting restrictive state laws, federal policy encouraged HMOs to
provide not only good, economical care for their subscribers but
also healthy competition for the dominant fee-for-service system.
Many competitive variants have surfaced since that time, culminating in a number of recent federal legislative proposals.4
To date, many different ideas have been put forth' in the public debate over restructuring health care financing to create more
competition. As just mentioned, some proposals have been introduced formally as legislation while others have been set forth in
the literature with greater or lesser degrees of specificity concerning how they would work in practice. The following discussion is
therefore necessarily somewhat general in its terms.
Greater private economizing does not mean a reversion to
total first-party financing, but rather changes in the way thirdparty coverage is acquired. "Procompetitive" strategies have two
parts. The first is to make insurance premium payers more costconscious by increasing the reward for choosing relatively less expensive plans, so that insurers will be more price-competitive. This
goal is to be accomplished by government action: limiting the tax
subsidy for medical care purchases and restructuring insurance
purchase choices. The second element of the strategy is for insurers to translate these economizing insurance incentives into greater
efficiency in the medical services market. Little agreement exists,
however, about how this translation would occur. The assumption
44.

See, e.g., President's Message to Congress on National Health Strategy, 7

WEEKLY

COMPILATON OF PRESMENTIAL DocuMENTs 244 (Feb. 18, 1971) (supporting federal promotion

of HMOs). The result was the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300e to 300e-15 (1976) (setting minimum standards for HMOs and providing technical
and financial assistance to them).
45. HMOs are discussed at notes 64-68 infra and accompanying text.
46. In the 96th Congress, for example, three leading bills were the Health Incentives
Reform Act of 1979, S.1968, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); the National Health Care Reform
Act of 1980, H.R. 7527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); and the Health Costs Restraint Tax Act
of 1979, H.R. 5740, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Havighurst, Competition in Health
Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 vAN.L. REv. 1117 (1981); Marmor, Boyer &
Greenberg, Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VmD. L. REV. 1003 (1981).
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is that the insurance and delivery markets would develop many
different ways of holding down prices and delivering care more efficiently. Whatever paths are chosen, it is clear that, to succeed,
competition must ultimately restructure health care delivery as
well as health care financing.
Many proposals concerning the existing tax subsidy would
limit it rather than eliminate it; this approach would preserve a
government subsidy for the purchase of some reasonable amount
of insurance coverage without subsidizing very generous packages.
For example, Senator Durenberger's bill, introduced in 1979, set
the contribution limit for family coverage at $125 per month per

family.47 This limit is somewhat high, however, and would not af-

fect most current group insurance plans."8 How restrictive such a
limit would be thus depends on a number of factors, not the least
of which is the absolute limit itself. A second factor is whether the
incentive only penalizes "over"-spending or also rewards "under"spending-that is, whether companies and employees are allowed
to accept tax-free cash in lieu of the full health insurance subsidy.
Finally, there is the question of how quickly the subsidy limit will
be allowed to grow. Clearly an absolute dollar cap would have an
increasingly hard bite over time, while a limit tied to some rising
index would be less severe, depending upon the index.
The next step in promoting competition is for this increased
cost-consciousness of less-subsidized employees to be translated
into the choice of a lower cost plan. 49 In addition to changing marginal incentives by capping the tax subsidy, procompetitive proposals generally mandate that each employee be able to choose
among multiple plans of different price and benefit structures.
Many employees do not now have this opportunity. Choice would
be ensured by mandating that to qualify for the tax subsidy, firms
must offer multiple plans and make equal contributions to all of
them for any given person. Then, if an employee elects a lower-cost
plan, he benefits fully from the savings. The idea is to allow em47. Health Incentives Reform Act of 1979, S. 1968, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
48. The 1979 average for major employer plans was only $67 per month (not including
dental coverage). Thus, $120 per month "is a very adequate level of benefits; it corresponds
to the upper range of the large union plans with the glaring exception of auto," where
monthly family benefits may exceed $200 in some locations. Proposals to Restructure the
Financingof Private HealthInsurance:Hearingson H.R. 5740 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (Feb. 25, 1980) (statement .of Willis B.
Goldbeck).
49. Of course, whoever pays for coverage now benefits from economizing, but not on a
dollar-for-dollar basis because of the open-ended tax subsidy.
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ployees to keep every dollar saved by their economizing choices.
The increased cost-consciousness of premium payers thus presumably would lead to relatively lower-priced plans. Plans would then
lower their expenditures on medical care to match income.
Procompetitive proposals, however, are generally less specific
about the mechanisms for achieving savings than they are about
creating more insurer competition. 0
There are two basic ways that efficiencies might be achieved.
One method is to restructure consumer incentives; the other is to
utilize provider incentives or controls. Consumer incentives would
operate principally by increased cost sharing on covered services,
but also to a certain extent through the benefit package itself. An
illustration of the latter is that insurance purchasers might choose
(within the limits allowed by federal minimum standards) not to
cover certain services with insurance at all. These services might
include such predictable items as dental care, normal childbirth, or
certain types of outpatient psychotherapy. This method is a variant of cost sharing in that it creates a category of 100% cost sharing-the excluded services. Medical services efficiency is thereafter
presumably achieved both by harder bargaining by patients and by
competition among physicians for patients on the basis of price
and patterns of care. Cost sharing alone, however, is unlikely to
achieve sufficient changes. For one thing, cost sharing is indeed
only "sharing," so that consumers do not bear the full cost of care
in any range except perhaps initial deductibles. For another,
achieving the laudable goal of "catastrophic" protection dictates a
ceiling on out-of-pocket expenditures-above which there is no
cost sharing and all of providers' spending is covered. Moreover,
cost sharing, to achieve its impact, relies on consumer choice at a
time when consumer cost-consciousness and independence are
most limited-when care is needed and the urgency of treatment
and the anxiety over access to quality care may well greatly outweigh other considerations.
Provider behavior, on the other hand, may be more directly
affected in two basic ways by cost-conscious insurance plans. The
first way is to continue broad coverage for services from all providers but to subject them to external controls. Controls might be
placed directly on services (very much akin to government-spon50.

See, e.g., Egdahl & Walsh, Private Cost Containment: The Art of the Possible?,

300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1330 (1979); Havighurst & Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment,
300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1298 (1979).
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sored controls for public programs like PSRO or utilization review)
or on prices paid (somewhat akin to government rate setting, except that private companies do not enjoy government's coercive
power). The second way is to alter provider incentives directly by
creating competing groups of providers, from one of which an insurance plan's members would get all of their care. The idea is to
create true interprovider competition over prices and styles of care.
This change presupposes an end to the consumer's free choice of
provider and to the provider's free choice of patient and (insured)
treatment method. Thus, both consumers and providers may resist
such changes.
In practice, and certainly in the short run, one would expect a
mixed system of some sort-featuring some plans covering many
providers and imposing external controls, and some covering few
providers whose incentives are changed. To help draw lessons for
any competitive system in the future, it is instructive to reexamine
how competition has functioned under the current system.
IV.

LESSONS FROM CURRENT COMPETITION FOR FUTURE
COMPETITION

By no means should one suppose that competitive and economizing forces have disappeared from today's medical care services
and insurance markets. The impulse to better one's situation relative to others by acting in one's self-interest is a strong one, and it
motivates all actors in our medical economy. The focus and nature
of competition in medical care services and insurance is skewed,
however, because of the field's special characteristics. How and
why the current markets function as they do are important as
guides to future policy.
A.

Unproductive Competition

Desirable competition in the medical services financing and
delivery markets is that which results in appropriate economizing
based upon cost, quality, and accessibility of services. The goal is
efficiency in medical services, not some arbitrary level of spending
or a perception that some groups are competing on some basis with
other groups. Unfortunately, much current competition is unproductive when measured by this yardstick.
1.

Nonprice Competition in Medical Services

Price competition among providers for patients is greatly re-
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duced under a system of unconstrained third-party payment. Providers instead compete for insured patients by offering greater access, higher quality care (to the extent that consumers can perceive
it), or increased amenities. 1 Competition over these factors usually
produces cost-increasing behavior. Indeed, under the current system, consumer-patients may often quite rationally prefer higherpriced physicians, hospitals, and other providers to lower-priced
ones. When quality is difficult to assess, price may be taken as a
proxy for quality.5 2 Consumers may also simply enjoy the conspicuous consumption cachet of patronizing a high-priced rather than
a low-priced provider.

The end result is that consumers buy a lot of "flat-of-thecurve" medicine.5 3 As more goods and services of any type are purchased, the marginal utility provided by the last unit of each at
some point begins to fall, while the cost of producing it tends to
rise. It appears that many medical services may be so far along the

downward slope of the marginal utility curve that they are not
worth what third parties have to pay for them. Exactly how much
insured consumers "overspend" is unknown. The assumption that
there is a large amount fuels the demand for some change, by regulation or more price-oriented competition, to improve resource
allocation."
A good example of flat-of-the-curve medicine is the care de51. It is easy to find extreme examples of amenities, such as "free" color television in
hospital rooms. It is of course more difficult to determine whether having a private or semiprivate room rather than a bed in a ward contributes to good health (quality) or not
(amenity).
52. Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry: New Warriors into an Old
Battle, 23 ST. Louis L.J. 446, 476 (1979).
53. The expression is borrowed from Alain Enthoven. See generally Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan,298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 650 (1978). For a longer discussion of the
same concept, see Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 23, at 15-20 ("quality/cost no man's
land").
54. Obviously, normative statements about "overspending" are not empirically verifiable, and one person's unnecessary amenity may be another's valued service. Large estimates without sound basis often appear. The Massachusetts Medicaid program, for example, is currently attempting to win political support for a radical reshaping of the program
that, it is said, would save over 20% of the spending under the current approach. Interview
with R. Moran, program director, January 1981. See also Boston Globe, Jan. 8, 1981, at 15,
col. 2 ("22% Cut Proposed in Medicaid Funds"), Feb. 5, 1981, at 27, col. 1 ("Details Lacking
on Mass. Plan to Cut Medicaid"). For an interesting intra-article debate on expected public
program savings, see Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 23, at 20 n.45, 60-61 n.207.
This Article argues that much of the current system's bias toward higher spending is
desired by premium payers and even taxpayers, and no estimate of savings will be made
here. It is worth noting again that the greatest pressure for savings comes from government.
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rided by doctors as "defensive medicine." 5 This term refers to diagnostic or therapeutic services aimed at protecting the doctor
from a lawsuit, and not at improving the patient's prognosis. Most
of these services may be medically unnecessary or at least of low
medical value. No one knows how much defensive medicine is
practiced, but everyone seems to agree that it occurs and is a problem. Defensive medicine is often cited to argue that lawyers and
malpractice law intrude too far into the practice of medicine." Another explanation for the practice of defensive medicine, however,
lies in consumer ignorance and the existence of third-party payments, which permit professional priorities to dominate economic
considerations. Informed patients or insurers would not pay for
such care.
A second type of nonprice competition occurs when hospitals,
drug companies, medical laboratories, and other providers compete
more for the patronage of doctors-who are relatively indifferent
to cost-than for that of patients, who may have economic con57
cerns. The physician, not the patient, is their real customer.
Leaving aside kickbacks and side-payments of dubious morality
and questionable legality, such competition for doctors is not significantly based on price because the physician does not pay and is
poorly motivated-given third-party payment-to be cost-conscious on behalf of patients. Hospitals must fill their beds to stay
solvent, and because doctors are the only people who can help
them do so, hospitals are well motivated to offer inducements to
physicians. 8 Such inducements take the form of offering the highest practicable quality, so that doctors can practice medicine in
their preferred professional style. This competition prompts hospitals to acquire the latest technology almost regardless of cost or
proven effectiveness. Institutions also generally strive to offer full
services, including tertiary, high-technology, and specialist-oriented care, regardless of whether another hospital can provide it
better or cheaper. The inefficiencies, wasteful duplication, and
55. See, e.g., Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care:HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1397 & nn.71-76.
56. See id. at 1397 nn.73-74.
57. See V. FUCHS, supra note 4, at 56-78 ("The Physician: The Captain of the Team");
text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
58. A glance at publications aimed at hospitals confirms this observation. Consider the
following back-cover advertisement: "EMPTY BEDS ...Hospitals with new medical office
buildings have experienced sharp census increases and higher outpatient revenues .... We
fill empty hospital beds because we find doctors to fill medical office buildings." TRusTEE,
Oct. 1980, at 82.
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sometimes low quality that result from this tendency are often lamented and form one of the theoretical bases for supporting health
planning as a way to rationalize institutional services.5 9
Whether it is doctors competing for patients or other providers competing for doctors, the lesson is basically the same.
Given the nature of medical care and of the present financing system, what might be called "atomistic" competition among many
providers facing ill-informed and cost-indifferent consumers is very
likely to be cost-increasing rather than cost-reducing.
2.

Unproductive Competition Among Insurance Plans

The group insurance industry is very competitive, featuring
comparatively large and knowledgeable buyers (employers and occasionally unions), a large number of sellers (the "Blues" and commercial insurers), and a vast number of available permutations
upon the basic third-party payment model.6 0 Competition in this
industry, however, has not focused on the central cost-that of
providing medical care services. Although employers are sensitive
to costs and frequently may change plans or insurers to get lower
premiums, insurers' cost-cutting historically has been limited to
administrative costs. Consequently, automated claims processing,
checking for billing errors, and the like receive a lot of attention,
while attempts to influence medical resource allocation, which anger both providers and insured patients, has received very little attention. High priority goes to achieving broad coverage, full access
to providers, prompt claims payment, and the like, and insurers
sell their plans based on these factors rather than on medical efficiency. Although this method has changed somewhat recently, it
remains basically the case. 61
When asked why they sell so little medical cost containment,
insurers often insist that no market exists for medical cost containment. It does seem that employers and group insurance beneficiaries alike care far more about access to care, good coverage,
prompt payment, and the like, than they do about controlling pre59. See, e.g., Grosse, The Need for Health Planning,in REGULATING HnmTH FACmITIES CONSTRUCTION 27 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
60. See GROUP HEALTH INsuRANcE, supra note 15. Medicare and Medicaid are of
course not competitive, and their structures are set by government.
61. Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans recently have begun advertising that they save
money on medical spending, unlike their commercial plan competitors, which control only
administrative costs. E.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1980, at 17; id., Dec. 10, 1980, at 15; FORTUNE,
Nov. 17, 1980, at 32.
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mium costs.6 2 Stiff resistance to cost containment also comes from

provider interests. When insurer price ceilings are implemented,
providers typically remain free to collect the balance of their billed
fees from patients; this strategy then reduces to one of increased
patient cost sharing.
Similarly, creative ways have been found to enable employer
groups to administer their medical benefits more cheaply. Administrative services contracts allow large employment groups to selfinsure for most of their coverage. Insurers then insure for the riskiest portion of coverage-very high, unexpected bills-and administer the plan for a fee or percentage of the benefits paid. In this
way, groups save part of the risk premium that they would otherwise pay and also avoid state taxes on insurance premiums.6 3
One notable exception to the general dynamics of third-party
payment is a fundamentally different sort of health plan-the
health maintenance organization (HMO). Although it comes in
many institutional variations, the key features of an HMO are that
it arranges for the delivery of a full range of medical services for a
fixed price paid in advance and has agreements with the providers
of services to control the delivery of those services through a variety of means." The classic HMO is the prepaid group practice,
which controls costs by providing medical services through a
"closed panel"-or limited number-of physicians and other providers who typically are paid on a salaried basis. Other models
with similar payment incentives but different mechanisms for delivering care also exist.65
Unlike most third-party payers, HMOs attempt directly to influence their services' cost, quality, and access, and achieve significant reductions in expensive hospitalization. 6 Such plans first
62. H. Sapolsky, et al., Corporate Attitudes Toward Health Care Costs (Dec. 1980)
(unpublished report to Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for
Health Services Research).
63. Does Industry Actively Pursue Cost Containment? and Self-Funding, EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT PLAN REv., Jan. 1980, at 18 & 19. It is estimated that in 1978, some 18% of
commercial insurance company group coverage took the form of such self-funding, up from
less than 5% before 1975. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 8. In 1978 commercial insurers had
a slightly larger share of the market than did the Blues. Id. at 25.
64.

See

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: TOWARD A FAIR

(1974).
65. The most prominent is a fee-for-service model with an "open panel"-or large
number-of participating doctors who are paid fees for services and subjected to a variety of
extrinsic cost and utilization controls. See, e.g., Egdahl, Friedland, Mahler & Walsh, Feefor-Service Health Maintenance Organizations,241 J.A.M.A. 588 (1979).
66. The most comprehensive review of the literature estimates that HMOs save their
MARKET TEST
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played a significant role in California just after World War H and
today have achieved a substantial market share in that state. Yet
HMOs have not swept the country, and, even today fewer than five
per cent of the population is covered by an HMO. 67 Among the
many reasons for this small figure is that cost containment is less
important to people than are other goals. Even where they have a
significant market share, HMOs seem to compete as much or more
in access and quality as price. They strongly emphasize the comprehensiveness of their coverage, the good quality of their care, after-hours service, and so on. Moreover, rather than seeking great
increases in enrollment through major price cuts, HMOs typically
use their basic cost advantage to provide more extensive services,
usually on a first-dollar basis, and thereby attract consumers. Most
HMOs seem to offer broader services than comparable third-party
coverage plans but only at modest, if any, premium savings.68
3.

Risk Allocation Versus Medical Resources Allocation

Insurers concentrate considerable competitive zeal upon medical risk allocation rather than risk or cost reduction. Having a competitive edge in identifying and insuring lower-risk populations
rather than higher ones seems to be a surer and more attractive
way for insurers to make money than attempting to control the
medical care costs of the groups that are covered.
Group insurance on a third-party basis began on a large scale
with the formation of Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. These
plans initially used a "community rating" methodology-that is,
they charged all subscribers the same premium calculated in the
enrollees about 10-40% in the total cost of health care, counting both premium and out-ofpocket payments-almost all achieved by lesser hospitalization rates. Luft, How Do HealthMaintenance OrganizationsAchieve Their "Savings"?, 298 Nzw ENG. J. MED. 1336 (1978).
67. Demkovich, Cutting Health Care Costs-Why Not Let the Market Decide?, 11
NAT'L J. 1796, 1797 (1979) (8.3 million in 1979); 13 NAT'L J. at 2140 (1980) (9.1 million as of
July 1980).
68. "HMOs are most often in the position of trying to sell more benefits at a higher
price when competing with standard insurance plans," according to one analysis generally
favorable to HMOs. J. CHRISTIANSON, Do HMOs STIMULATE BENxFcUL CoMPETnMN? 17
(Inter Study 1978) (commenting on experience in Minnesota, along with Hawaii the focus of
the analysis). Christianson notes the role of government requirements in making IMOs offer such broad benefits. Id. Yet very comprehensive coverage and high quality care are fundamental to the HMO ideology. See, e.g., Phelan, Erickson & Fleming, Group PracticePepayment: An Approach to Delivering Organized Health Services, 35 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PRoB. 796, 800-02 (1970). In addition, they are probably very important to the acceptance of
HMOs by the general public even to the limited extent that they have been accepted in
most markets. It is significant that "cut-rate" competitors have not flourished.
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aggregate as adequate to meet anticipated medical expenses and
other costs. Commercial insurers then found it fairly easy to identify which groups had lower than average expected medical costs,
based upon underwriting predictions. The insurers moved to offer
those groups "experience rated" premiums specific to their actual
or expected experience that were lower than the community rate.
This strategy was more effective than attempting to offer lower
rates by controlling medical costs. Subtracting the lower risks from
the pool covered by community rating naturally raised the community rate further for those higher risks remaining in the pool. The
new, yet higher community rate increased the number of risks who
could benefit by experience rating in a continuing cycle. As a result, the entire industry has moved much closer to across-theboard experience rating."'
This "cream skimming" of preferred risks also can exist within
one employment group when more than one plan is offered to the
group members at one time-a comparatively rare phenomenon
until recently. If an insurer can attract persons with lower medical
risks to its plan, it can offer lower premiums without affecting the
efficiency of medical care. The apparent health care savings due to
multiple choice and competition among insurance plans may in
fact be due only to a realignment of insureds' risks rather than to
any efficiency gains. Some suspect that much or all of HMOs' cost
advantage may be due to risk selection rather than to improved
cost-control efforts.7 0 A high-cost-sharing plan, designed to make
cost-conscious patients demand greater medical efficiency because
they pay with their own money, may actually achieve many of its
economies through cream skimming.
69.

R. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 89-90, 214-20

(1963); S.

LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG?

11-12, 29-30 (1976).

See Luft, Feder, Holahan & Lennox, Health Maintenance Organizations,in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES, supra note 8, at 129,
142-46. See also H. Sapolsky, et al., supra note 62, at 20-21; Big Business Questions if
HMOs Reduce Cost of Employee Health Benefits, PSRO LETTER, March 1, 1980, at 5.
When insureds have multiple options and open enrollment periods, high-risk people have an
incentive to choose a good value like an HMO, which may promise comprehensive care with
almost no cost sharing for little or no greater premium than a conventional insurance plan.
Despite open enrollment, however, it is possible that location of HMO facilities may enable
them to deter high-risk persons disproportionately. Another possibility is that some of
HMOs' savings come from attracting people who do not like high-technology or high-surgery-rate care and thus select themselves to be less expensive recipients of care on the basis
of HMOs' reputations for discouraging surgery and hospitalization. To the extent that such
explanations are true, competition by HMOs does not improve overall medical resource allocation in the sense of providing more care for the same price or the same care for less. It
merely rearranges the financial burden.
70.
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High-cost-sharing meant to promote efficiency also sends signals to relatively low-risk, high-income people that they will save
money by joining. Any savings actually achieved by cost-sharing
thus may well be partly attributable to reallocations of risk, not to
increased efficiency. Individual enrollees may be able to predict
their likely risk-i.e., their need for medical insurance-far better
than any insurance underwriter. Indeed, especially if a plan's coverage is broad, consumers can control the timing of many covered
medical services, such as some types of elective surgery, normal
childbirth, and others. This type of "moral hazard" allows some
people the possibility of enrolling in a low-premium, high-costsharing plan in one year and thus contributes to cream skimming.
These individuals may then switch to a high-premium plan only in
a year when they expect high medical bills. Such "adverse selection" is a chronic problem for insurers that allow individual
options.
Rewarding lower-risk enrollees with lower premiums and penalizing higher-risk ones with higher insurance costs may or may
not be appropriate, depending upon one's philosophy. 1 In any
case, it is less obviously attractive than saving everyone money by
improving medical efficiency.
B.

Difficulties in Shifting to Productive Competition

Truly productive competition focusing on medical efficiency
cannot be expected to arrive quickly, even with the adoption of
competitive government policies. The first major reason is that
cream skimming, as just discussed, may prove to be more rewarding, at least in the short run, than driving hard bargains with
71. The basic question is whether high-risk individuals should pay higher insurance
premiums out of their own pockets, or whether they should be subsidized, either through
private risk pooling (as in the group insurance market) or through government subsidy of
some kind. Alain Enthoven's Consumer-Choice Health Plan is one of the few competitive
proposals to address this issue squarely. See A. ENTHOvEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACnCAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARM (1980).
Whether higher-risk persons should pay higher premiums is a matter of philosophy, but
one's attitude may be influenced by one's rough sense of the extent to which risk factors are
within the control of insureds. Higher premiums might promote healthy changes in behavior-if insurers are able to isolate them, economically establish differential premiums, and
avoid moral hazard. Unfortunately, only sketchy evidence exists about such matters of
health and risk. To the extent that lower premiums reward greater economy in the use of
medical resources rather than lower inherent risk, there is probably greater agreement on
their appropriateness. Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish whether low utilization is
due to low risk or high efficiency.
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providers and otherwise directly attacking medical inefficiency. 7
The second major reason is that current patterns of financing and
delivery may be more deeply entrenched than is often acknowledged by competition advocates. To change consumer and provider
behavior may require stronger action and more time than is often
predicted. The starting point for analysis is to note again how the
existing competitive insurance market differs from the policy goal
of competition to improve medical efficiency. The real questions
are why more insurer and employee group cost-reducing initiatives
have not already evolved, why it should be necessary to create
them through federal legislation, and whether the proposed legislative changes are sufficient to achieve the goal being sought. These
inquiries are necessarily speculative, since no systematic study has
been done of the current insurance system and tax incentives.
Nonetheless, many instructive inferences can be drawn.
1. The Tax Subsidy
Many of the features of current third-party payment plans are
very strongly entrenched and presumably will change only very
slowly. The insistence upon broad coverage, including nearly firstdollar coverage, with low cost-sharing, free choice of provider, costbased reimbursement, and few cost controls has been very strong.
That people have not been quick to take cost-saving initiatives
cannot be blamed entirely upon the tax subsidy." The subsidy today means that the typical person or group choosing a plan is
spending, for example, seventy-cent dollars. In other words, any
reduction in benefits saves only seventy cents for each one dollar of
benefit foregone. Despite this initial observation, it must be realized that a dollar's reduction does nonetheless save seventy cents.
Thus, the incentive to save money is there; it is just weakened. Yet
72. See id. at 78-82. The Enthoven plan would establish different risk categories for
tax subsidization purposes. To the extent that this plan is practicable, its success would
ameliorate the cream skimming problem. Making it work requires considerable increases in
administrative complexity and in government "regulation" of insurance practices.
73. See notes 47 & 49 supra and accompanying text. The tax subsidy is the double
exclusion of health insurance premiums from taxation. Employer contributions are both deductible as business expenses in computing the employer's taxes and not included as income
to the beneficiaries on whose behalf the contributions are made. See generally Vogel, The
Tax Treatment of Health Insurance Premiums as a Cause of Overinsurance, in NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER?, supra note 2, at 220. Its existence is often cited to explain why private insureds buy first-dollar coverage. See, e.g.,
Pauly, National Health Insurance: Government Regulation or Consumer Choice?, AM. C.
SURGEONS BULL., May 1980, at 14, 17.
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cost-saving initiatives are not very popular, and the big growth
area in health insurance is expanding coverage (such as the very
rapid growth of dental plans) and not containing costs. In particular, the trend has been to reduce cost-sharing, especially at higher
levels of spending. Presumably, people feel that cost-sharing saves
less money in insured spending than the tax subsidy provides.
Similarly, the subsidy causes people to want to buy more coverage. In deciding how to spend tax-subsidized dollars in designing
a health package, however, it does not seem logical that the decision to start with shallow rather than catastrophic coverage, for
example, is influenced by whether the purchaser is spending seventy-cent or one-hundred-cent dollars. Additional evidence of the
strength of nontax factors is that over half of Medicare eligibles
spend after-tax dollars to buy supplementary coverage that usually
fills in Medicare's deductibles and coinsurance. ' People seem to
prefer shallow coverage for reasons other than the tax subsidy-reasons that proposals to increase competition may need to
identify and change. A similar case can be made with respect to
other cost-enhancing preferences such as free choice of provider.
2.

Consumer Preference for High-Cost Care

It is possible to argue thatprovider preferences, the accidents
of historical development, or other factors have contributed to the
present situation.7 5 One should take very seriously, however, the
simple hypothesis that current plans do not focus on medical cost
control because no one really wants them to. As patients, as (subsidized) premium-payers, but also even as taxpayers, consumers desire freedom from cost controls in order to avoid facing hard allocative decisions. For example, consumers might save money and
receive more efficient care if they belonged to a plan that required
certain well-designed cost sharing and that avoided the cream
skimming/adverse selection problem. Yet because the savings
might well be achieved only at considerable psychic cost-having
to confront very hard choices about foregoing care-consumers
prefer to pay more, both as individuals and through social choices.
74. See, e.g., HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., ABUSES IN THE
SALE OF HEALTH INSURANCE TO THE ELDERLY IN SUPPLEMENTATION OF MEDICARE: A NATIONAL

SCANDAL (Comm. Print 1978). It must be conceded that the shallow nature of Medicare
Supplement insurance is partly due to regulatory requirements; but these requirements are
considerably influenced by insurance industry interests and perceived consumer preferences.

75. See, e.g., Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-ControlledHealth Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48 (1977).
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Examining the HMO experience also raises some doubts about
how quickly a cost-conscious third-party payment regime can be
created. Again, one is left with the impression that people want
high-quality, expensive coverage more than many commentators
may realize. HMOs enjoy a considerable cost advantage over insured fee-for-service practice because of significantly reduced hospitalization. Yet they compete in great measure by providing more
comprehensive coverage (and lower cost sharing) rather than a
lower premium.7 6 Significantly, there seem to be no "neo-HMOs"
offering lower hospitalization and more limited other services, at a
great savings in premiums. Of course, premium savings provide relatively lower benefits than savings on cost sharing because of the
tax subsidy.
3.

Resistance to Multiple Plan Options

In addition to capping the tax subsidy, another competitive
change is to require employers to offer multiple plan options to
employees. Each individual with after-tax dollars at stake can then
seek to choose the level of economizing that he wants in a plan.
One must wonder, however, why, if it makes economic sense to require such options at all, the current health insurance market has
not adopted this approach. As a concomitant, it is often proposed
that employers who do offer multiple plans should make the same
contribution to each, so that employees choosing a cheaper plan
will receive the full benefit of their economizing. Again, it is not
clear why employment groups do not do so now. One possibility is
that they paternalistically prefer that employees undertake higher
medical spending and thus give a higher payment to those choosing more expensive plans. This explanation is not appealing. Another is that large unions, whose health plans have a considerable
pace-setting influence, prefer to take compensation in benefits
rather than additional take-home pay. One important reason that
multiple-choice options may not be popular as cost-cutting mechanisms is that it is difficult to tell whether they actually do cut
costs. When a plan saves money and can offer lower premiums by
seeking out and insuring generally lower-risk enrollees, it simply
rearranges the total spending of the entire group because the remaining higher-risk enrollees must pay more. A group may quite
rationally prefer to have no option at all than to have one that
encourages such cream skimming.
76.

See note 68 supra and accompanying text.

COMPETITION VS. REGULATION

1981]

When a plan saves money by excluding certain services or by
imposing high-cost-sharing on some or all services, enrollees will
segregate themselves by their perception of their risk. The -result is
"cream skimming" for plans that draw low risks and "adverse selection" against plans attracting high risks. It is possible for plans
to protect to some degree against adverse selection-for example,
by imposing waiting times on certain benefits and thoroughly investigating claims. Insurers who sell in the individual market,
where the problem is much worse because of the greater incentives
to self-select, do use such methods, but they are expensive. Because of this and other reasons, individual insurance plans generally offer much less coverage at greater cost than group insurance.
A similar phenomenon involves the premium-rating changes
that an insurer (or several insurers) must make if a group moves
from single coverage for a large group to a set of competing coverages each for a smaller number of people. Although the aggregate
risk of illness or accident does not change, the risk as perceived by
each of the smaller insurers is larger than its pro rata share of the
total. This effect is independent of changes in coverage that may
induce greater demand for medical care. The law of large numbers
makes the predictability of claims greater for a large group than
for smaller subgroups; insurers refer to the "credibility" of a
group's experience being greater.77 Because of this fact and the
likelihood of adverse selection, insurers must get a higher "risk
premium" to insure a smaller group. This factor is especially important to a small employment group today and would remain important under a more competitive system unless legal changes
ended the employment basis of insurance purchase or altered allowable pooling and rating practices.
4.

The Incremental Nature of Change

Another reason to believe that current insurance arrangements
will be slow to change is the incremental nature of the proposed
change in tax incentives. The tax subsidy would not be terminated
under existing proposals, but merely capped and made to grow
more slowly. This change in incentives, in the short run at least,
would have the greatest impact at the margin; that is, the cap
could be expected to halt the trend of bringing ever more services
under the health insurance umbrella to be bought with pre-tax dol77. E.g., D.
(1962).

MACINTYPE, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE AND RATE MAKING
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lars. Such items as dental care, mental health and alcoholism coverage, and coverage for chiropractors, nurse practitioners, and the
like have been added as discrete packages onto the more traditional acute care services. Plans already at the tax subsidy limit
presumably would stop adding such services unless the addition
itself would cause offsetting economies in the use of other services.
Altering the basic structure and operation of the more traditional
coverage, however, which at first would presumably still be affordable under the tax subsidy cap, would be likely to occur far more
slowly.
5.

Provider Resistance to Private Efforts

Finally, it is worth noting that providers are likely to resist
private cost containment, just as they resist public restrictions.
Many controls might apply to third-party payment plans that offered a relatively free choice of provider. Attempts to require prior
authorization for care or to otherwise limit medical practice are
likely to arouse the most opposition. Changes in coverage, leaving a
greater share of a provider's bill to be paid on a first-party basis,
will be less unpopular. In any case, it likely will take time for many
restraints to become effective; insurers will find it difficult to implement restraints piecemeal when providers have the option of receiving more unquestioned payment from other sources.
A major premise of many competitive proposals is that providers will align themselves into competing systems of care, so that
true inter-provider-group competition on price and styles of care
could occur. This is an important reason for the appeal of the earlier HMO strategy and is a major component of, for example, Alain
Enthoven's carefully thought-out scheme. 78 In the past, however,
physicians and hospitals have not been eager to affiliate with competing systems. The open question, again, is how much difference
would be made by the change in incremental consumer demand
because of the capping of the tax subsidy. Indeed, perhaps the
greatest incentive for a fundamental realignment of providers is
not a result of any overtly competitive policy at all-namely, the
apparent current oversupply of hospital beds and the impending
"surplus" of physicians. 9
78. See generally A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 71.
79. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING THE SUPPLY OF HOSPITAL BEDS
(1976); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FORECASTS OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND REQUIREENTs

(1980).
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For all of these reasons, it seems likely that the transition
from the current low cost-consciousness to an efficient, fully competitive regime could take considerable time.80 Indeed, it may
never happen as envisaged if consumer and political preferences
continue to militate against efficient medical resource allocation.
V.

A.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Insights for the Competitive Approach

There is general agreement that medical care should be provided more efficiently. Achieving this goal requires careful attention to how provider and consumer controls or incentives are structured-whether through regulation or competition. This Article
argues that two key considerations must be kept in mind when discussing competitive strategies. First, it must be understood clearly
that the goal is true systems competition based on medical efficiency. One should not mistake this objective for those laissez-faire
policies or unproductive competition that actually raise costs or
simply rearrange them through cream skimming and adverse selection. Second, the magnitude of the task should not be underestimated, particularly with respect to public beneficiaries. Real competition will come slowly, with considerable resistance from
established interests-both provider and consumer-and traditional patterns of operation in the health care sector. Many aspects
of our current financing and delivery system are apt to continue
unchanged, most notably the basic pattern of third-party payment
itself. These general insights lead to a number of more specific observations about future changes. Although it is difficult to predict
just how various procompetitive plans actually would alter medical
services delivery in practice, it is useful to examine each of the alternatives and to consider its possible influence.
1. Government Regulation
Considerable "regulation," or at least government action, is required to create systems competition. This realization is hardly
surprising, given the extent of past government action and the extent to which this nation has chosen-through both public and private mechanisms-to move away from reliance on an atomistic
80. One realistic assessment is that "it would take a decade or more before half of the
population was cared for by some kind of alternative financing and delivery system." A.
ENTHOVEN, supra note 71, at xxiv.
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"free market" of completely autonomous individual buyers and
sellers. Innumerable subtle and not-so-subtle incentives have been
created in the effort to achieve the entirely appropriate social goals
of risk spreading and caring for the needy. Changing the current
climate to reintroduce more effective cost-controlling incentives
will require more government action, whether it be pro-competitive
regulation or more traditional government regulation.
On the level of consumer purchases of insurance plans, for example, restructuring the tax incentives, standardizing minimum
benefits packages, and requiring multiple choice of plan and open
enrollment periods all call for social choices through government.
Guarding against cream skimming and adverse selection is another
problem that may well call for government action, especially if integration of the currently uninsured into the group insurance plan
market is attempted. On the supply side, encouraging the development of competing groups of providers and preventing existing
providers from unfairly resisting attempts to impose cost discipline
are important objectives of government action. It has been suggested that vigorous antitrust action should help prevent providers
from acting in concert to resist cost control.8 1 While this effort may
not be classic economic regulation, providers would certainly perceive it as a new governmental intrusion. Moreover, antitrust by its
nature fails to provide positive incentives to providers-for example, to reorganize into competing groups.
While the need for government action may seem obvious, it is
also often overlooked. In particular, it appears that considerable
current support for the general notion of "competition" is based
less on a procompetition ideology than on antigovernment sentiment. Some people want government simply to stop interfering-whether by imposing governmental controls or by encouraging private controls-with the third-party payment system that
has proved so lucrative for providers.82
81. See Havighurst, ControllingHealth Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, supra note 24; Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health
Care Financing, 1978 DuKE L.J. 303; Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 50. See also
Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, supra note 46;

Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REV. 927 (1981).
82. For example, current federal policy encourages the purchase of "generic" drugs
rather than more expensive brand-name equivalents. This policy is effectuated for government program beneficiaries by limiting the program payment to the cost of the generic
equivalent and by issuing a booklet explaining equivalence to beneficiaries. While there are
technical difficulties in determining equivalence, this policy is essentially straightforward
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Under one "procompetitive" bill, for example, Medicare itself
and a new federal plan covering catastrophic expenses otherwise
uncovered by third parties would have to pay "reasonable costs" to
hospitals and "usual, customary, and reasonable" fees to physicians.88 Perpetuating these mechanisms, particularly for the very
large share of hospital care that would be involved, is hardly likely
to realign medical services delivery or to save money.
2.

Government Program Costs

To the extent that separate government programs continue for
people unable to buy private insurance, the need to control program costs will continue. On this problem, public and private plans
can undoubtedly learn from one another. A good deal of the cost
problem under unconstrained third-party payment results from an
uncertainty about how best to alter the delivery system in order to
save money. It is notable, however, that already some government
regulatory initiatives have been modeled on private plan cost control measures. The PSRO program, for example, which was greatly
opposed by organized medicine, actually had its basis in initiatives
taken by medical societies.8 4 Conversely, private plans may be able
to benefit from adapting some notions currently most salient in the
public sector. Different hospital payment methods from the almost
universal per-service, cost-related reimbursement method may well
be useful to private as well as public plans. Thus, by adopting each
other's best ideas, the public and private sectors could work together to hold down program costs.
In addition, it is important to remember that rules addressing
what care is considered necessary, what length of stay in a hospital
is allowable for a given type of case, how providers are paid, and
the like are standard provisions that are essential to the operation
of any health plan, even if for public plans they are set by governand pro-consumer-choice. Yet it is far from universally accepted among those who purport
to favor deregulation and procompetitive proposals. See, e.g., Demkovich, Reagan's Cure for
Health Care Ills-Keep the Government's Hands Off, 12 NAT'L J. 2124, 2127 (1980). Everyone favors cost containment-except when his favorite ox is being gored.
83. The Medical Expense Protection Act, H.R. 6405, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2111
(1980).
84. For the derivation of the PSRO program from the American Medical Association
(AMA) national health insurance proposal, see SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D

SEss., BACKGROUND MATERIAL RELATING TO PSROs (Comm. Print 1974). PSRO review is
based on the style of review used by fee-for-service HMOs discussed in Egdahl, Friedland,
Mahler & Walsh, supra note 65. For the AMA's current view of the program, see Delegates

Vote to Seek Elimination of PSRO, AM.

MED.

NEWS, Dec. 19, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
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ment "regulations." This sort of cost control clearly should be
maintained until a fully competitive regime is established and government beneficiaries can be integrated into a system of competing
health plans.
3.

Systems Competition

The proper goal of the competitive strategy is "systems" competition among competing plans, not "atomistic" competition
among individual providers facing individual insured consumers.
Past experience has shown that, given the opportunity, individual
providers compete only too vigorously-and in cost-increasing
ways. Consumer incentives, including those of large group insurers
acting on behalf of consumers, must be -realigned to place far more
emphasis on cost control before an effort is launched to make providers more competitive through antitrust or other means. Most
competitive proposals recognize this prerequisite and would indeed
begin by restructuring the insurance market. As argued above,
however, these changes in the market for medical services will
come slowly, and thus there is reason to be cautious.
Private cost consciousness must truly be ready to supplant
public controls before the controls are abandoned entirely. Consequently, a number of public controls-like state hospital rate setting which operates as real competition should by constructively
altering hospitals' treatment incentives-should be retained in the
interim. 5 Moreover, even less meritorious types of regulation
should be reviewed carefully before they are summarily jettisoned.
For example, since there is little evidence that the current approach to health planning has actually reduced institutional investment or saved third parties money, it is a prime candidate for
repeal or drastic alteration under competitive approaches. Such
steps would be unwise, however, until hospitals and other institutions clearly understand that their future prosperity depends on
their satisfying more cost-conscious third parties rather than on
receiving cost-based reimbursement. Ending even such a questionable restraint as the current planning system could send the wrong
signal to providers if it is done before other changes have clearly
altered provider incentives and expectations.
85.

New Jersey's experiment with "DRG" rate setting is one such incentives-based

approach. See

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,

supra note 41.
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4. Flexible Government Policies

Antitrust and other procompetitive policies need to be flexible.
What approach will most appropriately reaffirm the need for costconsciousness in medical decisionmaking will vary according to
how systems competition operates in practice. If the marketplace is
reorganized into small groups of providers, each competing with
the others to give enrollees comprehensive health care, and cream
skimming/adverse selection does not prove an insurmountable
problem, consumers' informed choices of plan will translate directly into an appropriate incentive for the plans' providers to conserve resources. This is essentially the strategy adopted by HMO
proponents. On the other hand, if many or most consumers continue to participate in plans that are run more like today's insurance plans, with free choice of provider, stiff controls extrinsic to
each provider's internal economic incentives will be necessary.
Under these circumstances, providers' resistance to change can be
expected to be more severe and more successful, because they will
be able to play one plan off against another. Consequently, prevention of such behavior increases in importance, and antitrust enforcement should play a greater role. Indeed, if one believes that
the market for medical care services must be realigned into competing systems of providers in order for economizing pressure in
the insurance market to be translated into efficiencies in the delivery of services, one should consider incentives more positive than
antitrust enforcement to encourage such realignments.
Those seeking to improve future competition among providers
through antitrust must obviously set policy and attempt to influence judicial doctrine according to how the marketplace is functioning at the time. In practice, this flexibility may mean following
a "Rule of Reason" approach in order to carefully analyze the effects of given trade restraints.86 In particular, it is important to
keep in mind that the goal is systems competition, not atomistic
competition. Antitrust policy and doctrine should recognize that
many restraints on individual freedom that may be inappropriate
under atomistic competition are entirely appropriate for competition among competing health care systems.
Some plan requirements may at first blush seem anticompetitive. Limits on fees may appear to be price fixing and, when enforced by refusals to deal with noncomplying providers, may result
86.

Cf. Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 81.
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in antitrust suits. The facts as described by the United States SuCourt in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
preme
8
Co.,

7

for example, show entirely appropriate behavior for a com-

petitive insurer. The "Blues" plan in Royal Drug limited the
amount that it would pay to participating druggists and then essentially penalized subscribers using nonparticipating druggists.
The druggists charged price fixing and a boycott but lost in the
lower courts on the ground that suit was barred by the McCarranFerguson Act. 8 The Supreme Court, reversing on the McCarran
ground, expressly noted that it was not deciding the merits of the
case. e9 Nonetheless, the case may have a chilling effect on other
insurer controls. In this context, it is encouraging that in a footnote the Court cited a government brief arguing that although the
"Blues'" practice might be subject to antitrust scrutiny, on the
merits it was perfectly legal. e0
In most contexts, price fixing by a third party to a commercial
transaction is considered unwise or illegal price maintenance. The
now discredited "Fair Trade Laws" are a good. example. Under
these laws, prices set by a manufacturer artificially inflated retail
prices.9 1 In health care, however, third-party payment and provider
dominance present a different problem. Under proper systems
competition the insurer can be viewed as a vital party to the retail
transaction, needed to supply otherwise-absent price consciousness. Insurers ideally should act and be seen as acting almost as
the agents of premium-payers and future patients in preserving
the plans' funds for the highest-valued uses. 2
87. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). See generally Note, Insurance Provider Agreements Subject
to Antitrust Scrutiny, 17 Hous. L. REv. 643 (1981).
88.

440 U.S. at 207-08.

89.

Id. at 210.

90. Id. at 210 n.5. The Blue Shield plan in Massachusetts has been sued in several
interrelated actions for limiting the fees of its participating physicians, not allowing them to
balance bill their patients for more, and not paying nonparticipants at all. Thus far, the
plan has been upheld, essentially on the state action ground that the insurance laws and the
insurance commissioner have required or overseen the various aspects of the cost controls.
See Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 592 F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979) (federal antitrust suit); Nelson
v. Blue Shield, Inc., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 953, 387 N.E.2d 589 (1979) (Mass. state action).
91. See 2 E. KIMNNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW §§ 10.15-.16 (1980).
92. As a matter of antitrust doctrine, this result probably could be achieved by applying the Rule of Reason, rather than a per se analysis, or by use of the doctrine of ancillary
restraints. For a different perspective on the proper antitrust role in health care, see
Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 81.
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Realistic Expectations

Since the transition to true systems competition is likely to be
long and difficult, one should not expect too much too soon. Old
habits-and interests-die hard, and overly high expectations
could cripple a reasonable incentives-based strategy if it did not
produce results quickly enough. In attempting to move to a competitive ideal, reasonable "half-way houses" should not be rejected
simply because they are not ideal. Letting long-range perfection be
the enemy of immediate good is a short-sighted policy. For example, one result of existing health plan competition has been the
appearance of fee-for-service, physician-run HMOs, often called
Individual Practice Associations because they provide for physician services through associations of doctors known as "IPAs." 9
While on theoretical grounds it is proper to be concerned about
any large group of sellers controlling the prices and terms of
purchase of their services, what is objectionable here is that local
physicians might use such a plan to lock all or almost all local physicians into the IPA alternative. Such a tactic could easily block
still better developments that would be more adverse to physician
interests. Yet because IPAs considerably improve physician incentives over the current system of fee-for-service under unconstrained third-party payment and appear able to reduce spending
below current levels, it seems desirable to allow their existence, at
least pending better long-range developments. 4
6.

Lingering Features

Relatively unconstrained third-party payment with free choice
of provider and service benefits may long maintain a significant
market share. This approach is extremely popular with providers
and consumers alike. To the extent that such plans persist, the
problems of the present system will likewise endure, although perhaps in a less pervasive form. 5 It may thus be appropriate to seek
93. IPAs are so called because of the use of this term in the federal HMO Apt to
describe groups of fee-for-service physicians through which fee-for-service HMOs would
provide medical services. See Egdahl, Friedland, Mahler & Walsh, supra note 65.
94. A major issue is whether the antitrust laws do or should bar professionally run
HMOs like IPAs. See generally Havighurst, supra note 24. The FTC is presently considering whether and under what circumstances physician control of medical prepayment plans,
including Blue Shield and IPAs, may be anticompetitive. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,019 (1980). If the
IPA-style plan is considered a significant stumbling block on the road to a more competitive
system of provider groups, the tax subsidy laws could be changed to incorporate a requirement that eligible insurance or other medical services plans not be of the undesired type.
95. The problems would persist in the sense that inappropriate consumer-patient and
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system-wide controls of some types-particularly on payment rates
and appropriateness of care-either by private plans acting in concert or by government action, particularly if government beneficiaries are still covered by relatively unconstrained third-party

payment.96 For example, commercial health insurers today have
been reluctant to initiate ceilings on physician fees or hospital
charges because each fears that affected providers or even all providers would then refuse to deal with its insureds. Insurers believe
that such controls are only feasible if most or all insurers agree to
impose them at once, but they reject such joint action because of
likely antitrust liability. Interestingly, in Connecticut, home of
many major commercial health insurers, which dominate the market there, the insurance industry has been the major supporter of
the state-run hospital rate-setting program.7
Under a more competitive regime than presently exists, with
consumers lacking an open-ended tax subsidy to help pay high
provider prices, cost-containment initiatives would have a better
chance for success. Nonetheless, it is still worth considering
whether to allow concerted action by consumers through their
health plans to counter entrenched resistance. If, in the development of a more competitive system, a number of third-party, freechoice-of-provider plans share a market with smaller closed panels
of providers, it does not seem inappropriate for the free-choice-ofprovider groups to be able to take a joint approach to restructuring
payment in their subsector of the health services market. Such

joint setting of fees and rates would be somewhat troublesome, but
provider incentives would continue. Pressure for reform might therefore also continue. To
the extent that the resulting costs were "privatized," that is, kept within the particular
groups of individuals with relatively unconstrained third-party payment, government might
be able to ignore it. To the extent, however, that the problem was one of risk allocation and
that a result was increased pressure on government provision of care of last resort and on
government programs, it might be less possible to ignore it.
96. Some may contend that, beyond initial procompetitive changes, government
should not intervene further. One philosophy of political economy would hold that if truly
competitive alternative systems do not develop once tax incentives and other inhibiting factors are altered, then people must not want them. Thus, in this view, there would be no
further role for government to play; and, indeed, at least government's tax losses would be
limited. It seems appropriate, however, to recognize that people- could rationally prefer to
make choices through social mechanisms when relatively unfettered individual choices do
not achieve policy goals for which there is a political consensus. Moreover, tax subsidies and
other market intervention (such as licensing to promote quality) would remain. Thus, government could properly consider different interventions into medical services financing and
delivery, even while in some sense preferring a fully competitive system.
97. Interview with Bernard Forand, Executive Director of the Connecticut Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, in Hartford, Connecticut (Apr. 9, 1980).
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it is far less troublesome than a system of fee setting directly by
provider groups that tends to raise rates. The worst thing that
could happen with such a shared rate-setting approach would be a
decrease in the supply of medical services below what consumers
want because prices might be too low to prompt providers to
render enough services. In such an eventuality, consumers would
surely bid up the price to restore services. An easier case would be
joint agreement on the type of payment to be made; one exafnple
might be to move to a per-case payment instead of cost-reimbursement for services.
B. Making a Transition to Competition
The picture that this'Article envisions is not a rosy one of
inefficient regulation quickly and painlessly being supplanted by
smoothly operating market forces. Rather, it seems likely that regulatory and competitive forces will coexist at least during some
rather lengthy transitional period even if a fully procompetitive
strategy is enthusiastically embraced by all levels of government.
Indeed, it may well be that the transition will last forever. There is
reason to believe, as already discussed, that many cost-enhancing
features of the current financing and delivery system are strongly
desired and will not be altered by procompetitive changes so as to
create strong alternative forms of delivery.
The competitive ideal, like the regulatory ideal, thus in practice may be either unattainable or at least long delayed. Consequently, a final caution is that in coping with a mixed system,
whether during a transitional period or in the longer run, unproductive combinations should be prevented. Commentators favoring
competition have long focused on how regulatory approaches may
cripple market-oriented strategy.98 Equally, some conceptions of
competitive strategies may hamper legitimate government objectives. Coordination of strategies is therefore important. One potential conflict exists between current health planning's efforts to
limit institutional expansion and antitrust policies in favor of facilities' freedom to expand in pursuit of competitive advantage. 9 Another conflict is the tension between allowing free competition
98. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 64. See also Egdahl, Friedland,
Mahler & Walsh, supra note 65; Rosoff, supra note 52, at 479-80.
99. See National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 938 (1981); Business Review Letter, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Division, May 6, 1980 (case of Central Virginia Health Systems Agency); id., Aug. 27, 1980

(case of Westlake Health Campus).
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among insurers and avoiding unproductive cream skimming, particularly in the difficult merging of public beneficiaries into private
plans. Following a competitive policy in this sphere with the left
hand while trying to pursue an avowedly nonmarket strategy with
the right hand may prevent both policies from succeeding. Economists are familiar with this truism as "the problem of second
best": when not all conditions for reaching the optimum competitive equilibrium are met, attempting to reach just one of them will
not necessarily bring the system closer to the optimum. 10 0 Common
sense indicates that an uneasy marriage of incompatible strategies
can easily lead to the worst of both worlds instead of the best.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Moving to a truly price-competitive health care financing and
delivery system that also achieves other important goals will be
neither easy nor quick. Significant governmental and other concerted action will probably be necessary to promote competition
that actually focuses on more effective and efficient delivery of
medical services rather than on unproductive cream skimming and
nonprice competition. Ending the current tax subsidy for the
purchase of insurance will certainly not be enough, nor is it realistic to seek a complete return to first-party incentives to promote
cost control and efficiency. What we need is a judicious mix of government and private action; "regulation" and "competition" must
learn to coexist without hampering each other. The most important goal is to reintroduce cost-containing incentives into provider
behavior, whether through regulatory or competitive means, and
the present may be a particularly auspicious time for such an undertaking. Pressures for cost control within the public sector at all
levels are extremely high. Moreover, by all accounts, a more-thanadequate supply of both physicians and hospitals exists. Provider
resistance may thus be less than might otherwise be the case.

100. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT,
286 (1971).
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